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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KNIGHT REALTY INV. CO. , a
Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
CHARLES C. MOORE AND
CHARLES C. MOORE d/b/a
SOUTH VILLAGE SHOPPING
CENTER AND SOUTH VILLAGE
SHOPPING CENTER AND SOUTH
VILLAGE, INC., a Utah
Corporation,

No. 16550

Defendant-Appellants.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-Respondent, Knight Realty, Inv. Co., hereinafter termed Plaintiff, filed an action in the District Court of
the Third Judicial District to enforce a contract for the payment
of a real estate commission based upon a lease of property owned
by Defendant-Appellant, South Village, Inc., hereinafter termed
Defendant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
1.

The above-entitled matter was tried on April 18,

1979 before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., a post-trial
memorandum was filed by the Plaintiff pursuant to the Court's
request for memoranda and after due consideration, the District
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Court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a
Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant
in the amount of Eighteen Thousand Dollars ($18, 000) with

intere 1~

thereon. (R. 55-63.)
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant, South Village, Inc., seeks a reversal of
the judgment of the District Court and an award of Appellant's
costs on appeal.

Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment

of the District Court and an award of Respondent's costs on
appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's Designation of Record on Appeal (R.66)
specified that a transcript including all exhibits offered and
received should be included in the record on appeal.

After

Appellant's brief had been filed and during the preparation of
Respondent's brief, counsel for Respondent discovered that a

tr~

script of the trial was not part of the record on file with the
Court.

On

I

January 2, 1980, Counsel for Respondent called the [

reporter, Robert Lewis, concerning the transcript and he stated,!
after checking his records, that the transcript of the trial of
this matter had not been ordered by Appellant.
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i

It is well settled that where the Appellant fails to
file a transcript on appeal, the finings of fact of the trial
court are presumed to be supported by substantial evidence, and
the trial court's conclusions of law will not be overturned on
appeal if supported by the findings of fact.

Burton v. Garner,

374 P.2d 707 (Colo. 1962); Henry v. Latta, 472 P.2d 694 (Colo.
App. 1970); Shedd v. Adamson, 535 P.2d 799 (Nev. 1975); Reliance
Ins. Co. v. Marchiondo, 91 N.M. 276, 573 P.2d 210 (1978); Huckaby
v. Newell, 519 P.2d 1290 (Ore. App. 1974).
For example, in Burton v. Garner, 374 P.2d 707 (Colo.
1962), the appellant asserted that the findings of fact and judgment were contrary to the pleadings and the evidence, yet the
appellant failed to file the record on appeal.

The court ruled

as follows:
There being no transcript before us
we cannot consider this ground of asserted
error. In its absence we are bound to
presume that the findings and conclusions
of the trial court are correct and that
the evidence oresented supports the judgment.
374 P.2d at 709.
In Reliance Ins. Co. v. Marchiondo, 91 N.M. 276, 573
P.2d 210 (1978) the court stated:
The issue is whether under the state
of this record we can justify overturning
conclusions of law made by the trial court
that appear on their face to be properly
supported by the trial court's findings
of fact. We think not.
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The responsibility for seeing that
a proper record is filed for an appeal to
this Court is clearly that of the appellant.

Basic to the right of appeal is the
perfection, certification and filing of
the record by the person who intends to
rely upon it to support his assertions
in the appellate court. [Citations omitted).
The record before us is blank as to whether
evidence was adduced in the trial court on
the issues here involved orwhether there
were material rulings made by the judge.
We are confronted by the bare fact that no
transcript of either evidence or proceedings
is before us.
Having neglected to provide a proper
record on appeal, Reliance cannot challenge
here the correctness of the decision of the
trial court. [Citations omitted).
Conclusions of law properly supported by
findings of fact will not be overturned on
appeal unless it is shown that the facts are
not supported by substantial evidence. [Citations omitted]. Here Reliance has failed to
provide a record from which such a showing
could be made. 573 P.2d at 212-213.
Thus, the Appellant has no basis to challenge the find·!
ings of the trial court.

Those findings must be deemed conclusi~

The facts as outlined in the Findings are as follows:
1.

On April 23, 1976 a Real Estate Listing Agreement,

was executed by Keith Knight on behalf of the Plaintiff and
by Charles Moore on behalf of the Defendant which provided that
in consideration of the efforts of the Plaintiff to lease certair,
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property owned by the Defendant to Prudential Federal Savings
and Loan Association (hereinafter termed Prudential), Defendant
would pay the Plaintiff a commission.

(Exhibit 1-P; Findings of

Fact, No. 1, R. 56.)
2.

On or about the 31st day of August, 1976, the

Defendant executed a Lease Option Agreement whereby the
Defendant offered to build certain improvements upon the
property of the Defendant and to lease the same to Prudential.
The property described was located south of the existing First
Security Bank Building at approximately 9501 South 700 East
in Salt Lake County.

(Exhibit 2-P; Findings of Fact, No. 2,

R. 56.)
3.

On or about the 25th day of February, 1977, the

Defendant executed an Extension Agreement which extended the
option set forth in Exhibit 1-P and in addition thereto the
Defendant reserved the right to improve and lease alternate
premises directly north of the existing First Security Bank
premises.

(Exhibit 3-P; Findings of Fact, No. 3, R. 52.)
4.

On or about the 15th day of August, 1977, the

Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a further Real Estate
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Commission Agreement which provided for the payment by the
Defendant to the Plaintiff of a commission in the amount of
$18,000.

(Exhibit 5-P; Findings of Fact, No. 4, R. 56.)
5.

On or about August 15, 1977, the Defendant entered

into an Agreement of Lease with Prudential.

The lease described

the property north of the First Security Bank building.

At the

time of execution of the lease by the Defendant, the Defendant
endorsed thereon a statement to the effect that Defendant had not
yet received all of the tenants' approvals and then stated "if we

1

fail to receive their approval, the location south of the bank

(

will be made available to PFS (Prudential), same size."
C. Moore President.

/s/ Charle(

Mr. Moore also signed and noted the inclusion

1

on the last page of the lease of a "subject to clause" awaiting
approval of the tenants.

(Exhibits 4-P and 6-P; Findings of Fact,/
I

No. 5, R. 56-57.)
6.

A meeting took place in the offices of Defendant

on October 18, 1977.

Present at the meeting were Mr. Moore and

his son, Mr. Clawson, Mr. Charles Alcott of Prudential and Mr.
Keith Knight.

At that meeting, there was a discussion with respect\

to proceeding with the project.

Mr. Moore advised the parties

present that he was ready to proceed.

Reference was made to the
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limiting endorsement placed on the last page of the lease
(Exhibit 6-P).

A line was drawn through the limiting endorsement

by Mr. Knight.

A further endorsement was placed thereafter that

reads "null and void, cancelled".

Mr. Moore then signed this

further endorsement, thereby eliminating the prior condition.

Mr. Clawson was then authorized to proceed with the plans and
specifications which he did.

On that same date, October 18, 1977

and at that meeting, Prudential delivered to l1r. Moore Prudential's
letter dated October 14, indicating "that said lease agreement is
now in full force and effect and binding upon the parties."

(Exhi-

bit 9-P; Findings of Fact, No. 8, R. 57.)
7.

Mr. Moore acknowledged that he did not need the

approval of Rexall to complete the improvements for Prudential
on the location south of First Security's existing bank building.
(Exhibit 10-P; Findings of Fact, No. 9, R. 57-58.)
8.

Prudential remained willing to accept either of

the two locations.
9.

(Findings of Fact, No. 10, R. 58.)

Neither Mr. Knight nor Prudential had any notice

or knowledge of Defendant's contention that it required approval
of the tenants for the north location until on or about August 15,
1977 when Mr. Moore endorsed the limiting condition upon the
lease.

(Findings of Fact, No. 11, R. 58.)
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10.

Mr. Moore assured Mr. Knight that Rexall could

not prevent the completion of the project since even with
Prudential, the Defendant had the minimum amount of parking required by the Rexall lease.

Mr. Moore presented to Mr. Knight

his computations with respect to the required parking ratios.
(Exhibit 16-P; Findings of Fact, No. 12, R. 58.)
11.

Arrangements were made for Prudential to provide

the financing for the Defendant.
application therefor.

The Defendant never made formal

Ultimately the Defendant failed,

declined and refused to proceed.

neglecte~,(

Prudential then rescinded the (

lease because of Defendant's nonperformance.

(Findings of Fact,

No. 13, R. 58.)
12.

r

The trial court found that the Plaintiff had two

written commission agreements, the second incorporated by
reference into the first, and that the Plaintiff obtained

i

at~

for the Defenant upon the terms and conditions acceptable to thel
Defendant, all as set forth in the Lease Agreement (Exhibit 6-P) I
which was executed by both the Defendant and Prudential.

(Find·!

ings of Fact, No. 14, R. 58.)

I

ARGUMENT

I

POINT 1
APPELLANT'S CONTENTIONS OF ERROR
BY THE TRIAL COURT ARE NOT SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD ON APPEAL.

I

I

Appellant contends on appeal that the agreement for t~j
payment of the commission to Plaintiff was conditioned upon the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8-

completion or consummation of the lease and the obtaining of
financing and that the failure of such conditions was caused
not by the Defendant but by a third party.

This contention of

the Appellant is at variance with the findings of the Court and
is not supported by the record on appeal.
The lease, as originally executed, had a condition endorsed thereon by the Appellant.

At a later time, the Appellant

eliminated the condition by its further endorsement.
was in fact consummated.

The lease

Furthermore, the lessee remained willing

to accept an alternate location which did not require any approval
of a third party (Rexall).

In addition, the lessee was ready,

able and willing to provide the construction financing.

There-

after, the Appellant simply refused to proceed with the construction of the improvements.

Contrary to the unsubstantiated state-

ments in the Appellant's brief, the transaction failed not because
of some third party impediment but because the Appellant refused
to proceed after the Plaintiff had completely performed its service
and had effected a lease of the property.
Appellant concedes that the general rule is that a
broker's commission is earned once the broker has procured a ready,
willing and able buyer, or lessee, and that the commission cannot
be defeated by the owner's subsequent refusal to complete the
transaction.

(Brief of Appellant pp. 4-5).

In Curtis v.

Mortensen, 267 P.2d 237 (Utah 1954), the Utah Supreme Court held
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that the broker is entitled to a commission even though the sale
was never consummated.
The proposed purchasers were anxious to
buy the property even after respondent's
rescission of the earnest money agreement.
Their suit for specific performance is
ample proof of that fact. There can be
no question about their willingness to buy
and it was stipulated that they had the
financial ability to consummate the sale.
The sale was never consummated because the
respondents changed their minds and refused
to make a binding agreement. Under such
circumstances appellants have fulfilled their
part of the listing agreement by having
produced purchasers who were ready, willing and able to buy the listed property
and were entitled to their commission.
267 P.2d at 239.
This rule has been reiterated recently by the Utah
Supreme Court in Davis v. Heath Development Co. , 558 P. 2d 594
(Utah 1976).
[I]f an agent so performs [i.e. obtaining a ready, willing and able buyer],
and the sale is not completed because of
the lack of cooperation or obstruction
by the listor . . . , the agent is nevertheless entitled to his commission.
559 P.2d at 596.
The Plaintiff in this case produced a ready, willing (
and able lessee as is evidenced by the execution by Prudential i
of a binding lease agreement.

The fact that the lease was

not effectuated was not due to any failure on the part of
the lessee but was in fact due to the Defendant's refusal to
proceed.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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I

I

r
POINT II
THE APPELLANT' S OWN COUDUCT PREVENTED
THE CONDITION mUCH IT NOW CLAIMS
EXCUSES ITS PERFORMANCE.
The Appellant corrently notes that the supplemental
Real Estate Commission Agreement executed in August, 1977 provided
for payment of the commission from the construction loan but then
claims that since the construction didn't proceed, the condition
wasn't met and that Appellant is thereby relieved from its acknowledged obligation to pay the commission.
It is clear that the provision was not intended to
impose a condition precedent to the obligation of payment but
merely prescribed a convenient manner or schedule for paying the
commission which had already been earned.

Assuming, however, that

the construction was a condition precedent to the obligation to
pay the commission, such condition was excused or waived because
the Appellant actually prevented the construction.
Appellant concedes that "no one can avail himself of
the non-performance of a condition precedent who has himself
occasioned its non-performance."

Cannon v. Stevens School of

Business, Inc., 560 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Utah 1977).

(Brief of

Appellant p. 7).
The case of Hoyt v. Wasatch Homes, 261 P.2d 927 (Utah
1953) is particularly relevant.
the

In Hoyt, it was agreed that

broker's commission would be paid only if the sale were
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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consummated.

The sale was not consummated, the earnest money

agreement between the seller and the buyers having been mutually
rescinded.

The court held that the broker was entitled to his

collllllission notwithstanding the fact that the condition of conSUIIi·[
mation was not satisfied.
We are therefore impelled to the conclusion that the only reasonable interpretation of the facts and circumstances
shown is alternative (b): That the Johnsons had not failed in their obligations
so as to subject them to forfeiture, and
were ready, willing and able buyers.
Under such circumstances, Hoyt could not
by refusal to cooperate, defeat the
Defendant's right to its commission. And
we say this advisedly, notwithstanding
the finding of the trial court, that when
Hoyt originally engaged the Defendant to
sell the property, it was agreed that the
commission would be paid only if a sale
were consummated.
That agreement certainly contemplated
that the Plaintiff would cooperate in
good faith toward the accomplishment of
the purpose for which he employed Defendant. He cannot be permitted to procure
them to obtain a buyer, on terms accepted
by the Plaintiff, and then prevent the
accomplishment of what he requested and
authorized them to do by arbitrarily refusing to perform his part of the transaction. Under such circumstances, he will
not be heard to complain of their failure
to do that which he prevented. 261 P.2d
at 930.
Appellant contends however, that the failure was not I
caused by the Defendant but was in fact caused by Rexall' s refUS
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to consent.

(Brief of Appellant pp. 4-5).

untenable under the facts.

This position is

Under the terms of the Extension

Agreement (Exhibit P-3), the Defendant had the option to lease
either of two locations to Prudential.

Prudential remained willing

to accept either of the two locations.

The alternative location

was not subject to the consent of prior tenants.

Thus, it was

the Defendant's own action that created the necessity of obtaining
Rexall's consent.

The Appellant could have avoided that problem

by simply moving to the other location which was acceptable to
Prudential and over which Rexall exercised no control.
In any event, the Defendant's failure to obtain consent
does not relieve it from the obligation to pay the commission.
It has long been held that the seller's inability to transfer good
title does not defeat the broker's right to a commission where the
broker had no notice of the defect in title.

See,

~.

Little

v. Fleishman, 101 P. 984 (Utah 1909); Stewart v. Lesin, 302 P.2d
714 (Utah 1956).
Neither the Plaintiff nor the lessees had any notice that
the consent of Rexall might be necessary until August 15, 1977 when
the Defendant added the consent condition to the lease agreement
and even then the Defendant assured the Plaintiff that Rexall's
consent would not be necessary.

This consent condition was later

nullified and cancelled by the Defendant and thus is of no effect.
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I

The cancellation of this condition left intact and unconditional'•
the assertion on page one of the Agreement of Lease (Exhibit

N:

that the Defendant was the fee owner of and entitled to lease tl·.
subject property.

If the Defendant in fact was unable to lease!

the property because of lack of consent or any other reason, sJ
inability would not constitute a defense either to its obligati~l
to lease the property or to its obligation to pay the Plaintif£' 11
commission.
The case of Bradley

v.

,·'

Westerfield, 402 P. 2d 577

1965), is similar factually to the present case.

(Ariz.~

lI

In Bradley,

the broker was held to be entitled to a commission on the sale
of a bar even though the sale fell through because the second
mortgage holder refused to consent to the sale.

The court helO

as follows:
The Defendant [vendor] knew, or should
have known that there existed a restriction on the transfer of the license in
favor of the second chattel mortgagee.
In order to deliver merchantable title,
the duty to obtain his consent devolved
upon her. Her inability or neglect to
procure this consent did not relieve her
from the obligation to pay to plaintiff
the realty commission. 402 P.2d at 579-80.

CONCLUSION
There is no basis in the record on appeal upon which,
Appellant can challenge the conclusion of the trial court that

1

!
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the Plaintiff fully performed its obligation of procuring
a ready, willing and able lessee and thus earned the agreed
commission of $18,000.

The failure of the transaction subse-

quent to the execution of the lease was not due to any third
party but was due solely to the Defendant's refusal to proceed.
Therefore, the judgment of the trial court should be upheld.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

~

day of January, 1980.

WATKISS & CAMPBELL

Floor

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-15-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT were served upon the Defendant and Appell~t
South Village, Inc. by mailing the same, postage prepaid, to
Thomas P. Vuyk, Esq., 425 South Fourth East, Suite 100, Salt L
City, Utah 84111, this ~day of January, 1980.
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